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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that many consumers who need legal services do not 
have access to legal services.
1
 In fact, the legal community has grappled with 
this access issue for over a century.
2
 In the past 50 years, legal services have 
                                                 
*  A 2014 graduate of Hamline University School of Law now clerking for the 
Honorable Judge Rodenberg at the Minnesota Court of Appeals. A special thanks to Professor 
Jill Barclift for her patience and support through this process. And to the staff of the Hamline 
Law Review—I know how much care and dedication they put into this article and for that I 
am grateful. 
1 See infra text accompanying notes 130–133. 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 103–129. 
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been allocated to the very wealthy and the very poor, and almost entirely out 
of reach for all those in between.
3
 Enter LegalZoom: a slick, user friendly 
alternative to traditional face-to-face legal services.
4
 LegalZoom provides 
low- and middle-income consumers an option to easily start and run a 
business, minimally protect themselves and their families, and perform other 
routine legal services that would otherwise be economically unattainable.
5
 
However, LegalZoom has other, nonmonetary costs.
6
 In most jurisdictions, 
LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and does not 
provide the amount of confidentiality to its customers that is ordinarily 
required of those practicing law.
7
 While harms are possible, many harms 
could be avoided through regulation of LegalZoom’s services by state bar 
associations and supreme courts.
8
 
The following will argue that despite LegalZoom’s shortfalls, the 
legal community, due to its inability to provide access to all who need it, is 
ethically obligated to pass regulations which allow LegalZoom to continue. 
Part III.A provides an overview of the services LegalZoom provides and a 
brief history of the company. Part III.B discusses the ongoing litigation in 
which LegalZoom is entangled. Part III.C explains how unauthorized 
practice statutes and attorney client privilege pose problems to LegalZoom’s 
services, and whether or not there is actually cause for alarm. In Part IV.A 
the history of the legal community’s struggle to provide cost-effective 
services to all those in need is explained, along with the current state of legal 
services in Part IV.B. Part IV.C discusses the vacuum created by the 
availability of legal services to the very rich and the very poor, and some 
possible causes for the high costs of legal services driving the enlargement of 
this vacuum. Finally, in Part V, the following explains why it is ethically 
incumbent upon the legal community to pass regulations so that LegalZoom 
may continue to provide services to underrepresented populations while still 
protecting consumer interests. 
II. THE ONLINE FORM PROVIDER 
LegalZoom is not the first online legal form provider, but it has been 
the most successful.
9
 The following sections will explore LegalZoom’s 
services, explain LegalZoom’s legal troubles, and analyze the potential 
harms associated with the company’s services 
                                                 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 103–129. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 10–20. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 15–25. 
6 See infra text accompanying notes 65–76, 89–96. 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 65–76, 89–96. 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 176–180. 
9 See Lindzey Schindler, Skirting the Ethical Line: The Quandary of Online 
Legal Forms, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 185, 186 (2012). 
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A.  The Service 
Brian Lee and Brian Liu founded LegalZoom in 2001 after leaving 
corporate law practice.
10
 The vision was to create an easy, cost-effective 
service for consumers so that they may jettison the traditional model of face-
to-face legal services.
11
 LegalZoom allows customers to create a will, 
incorporate a business, file for bankruptcy and divorce, designate power of 
attorney, and even change their name, along with “other common legal 
matters.”12 No matter which legal service is requested, LegalZoom promises 
to fulfill customers’ requests in three steps: after logging in the customer (1) 
answers a series of questions specific to the legal document requested, (2) 
LegalZoom “assistants” (i.e., nonlawyers) review the customer’s answers for 
“consistency and completeness,” contacting the customer only if 
“clarification or additional information” is needed, and (3) LegalZoom prints 
the legal document requested and mails the document along with “simple 
wrap-up instructions” to the customer.13 Through this process LegalZoom 
guarantees the customer 100% satisfaction.
14
 
In addition to LegalZoom’s document preparation service, the 
company also offers Business Legal Plans and Personal Legal Plans 
beginning at $23.99/month and $11.99/month, respectively.
15
 These plans are 
subscription services, which allow a user to choose an attorney in the 
appropriate state and consult with said attorney on legal matters for 30 
minutes at no cost.
16
 Each time a subscriber initiates a 30-minute 
consultation they must have a new, unique legal issue.
17
 The subscription 
also includes an “annual checkup,” which LegalZoom prescribes is limited to 
                                                 
10 Daniel Fisher, Entrepreneurs Versus Lawyers, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2011, 6:00 
PM), www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/1024/entrepreneurs-lawyers-suh-legalzoom-automate-
daniel-fisher.html [hereinafter Entrepreneurs]. 
11 About Us, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/about_us.html (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2014). 
12 Id. (emphasis added). 
13 How it Works, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/about-us/how-it-
works (last visited Sept. 3, 2014). 
14 See LegalZoom—Easier and Affordable Way to Take Care of Legal Matters, 
YOUTUBE, (Sept. 11, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1xHweul84w. See also Our 
Satisfaction Guarantee, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/satisfaction-guarantee.html 
(last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
15 See Legal Plans—Business, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com
/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/business (last visited Sept. 3, 2014); see also Legal Plans – 
Personal, LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/personal 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2014). See generally LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2014). 
16 See Legal Plans—Business., supra note 15. See also Legal Plans—Personal, 
supra note 15. 
17 See Legal Plans—Business., supra note 15. See also Legal Plans—Personal, 
supra note 15. 
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one hour.
18
 The Business Legal Plan provides for an “Attorney-drafted letter 
on your behalf” of up to two pages, free legal document review for legal 
documents under ten pages, a 10% discount on any LegalZoom legal 
document (including personal forms), the registration of one copyright per 
month, and a 25% discount on any service provided by the subscribers’ 
LegalZoom attorney that is above-and-beyond the services provided by the 
plan.
19
 The Personal Legal Plan allows for the same benefits, save those 
relating specifically to business.
20
   
The service appears to be popular with consumers. In 2011, 
LegalZoom recorded revenues of just over $150 million, with a net income 
of approximately $12 million.
21
 In the 12 years LegalZoom has been in 
business, the company boasts two million business and personal users.
22
 In 
fact, in 2011, LegalZoom filed for an initial public offering (IPO) which 
valued the company at over $480 million.
23
 Although LegalZoom has since 
delayed its IPO (a result of discouraging market conditions), LegalZoom’s 
revenues continue to rise.
24
 With wills costing just $69
25
 and trusts priced at 
as little as $249
26
, it is understandable why consumers are flocking to this 
web-based alternative. 
 B.  The Litigation 
Success is not without consequence. In 2010, LegalZoom faced legal 
challenges from Missouri residents and the Washington State Attorney 
General’s office. 27  In 2011, lawyers from the DeKalb County Bar 
Association of Alabama sued LegalZoom, asking the court to enjoin 
                                                 
18 See Legal Plans—Business., supra note 15. See also Legal Plans—Personal, 
supra note 15. 
19 See Legal Plan—Business, supra note 15. 
20 See id.  
21 Tomio Geron, LegalZoom Files for IPO of Up To $120 Million, FORBES (May 
11, 2012, 4:15 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/05/11/legalzoom-files-for-ipo/. 
22 Home page, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com, (last visited Sept. 3, 2014). 
23 Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Valued at 40 Times Last Year’s Earnings for 
IPO, ABA JOURNAL (July 25, 2012, 9:38 AM) www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_
valued_at_40_times_last_years_earnings_for_ipo/. 
24 Reynolds Holding &Antony Currie, Do-It-Yourself Law Firm IPO Looks a Bit 
Too Feisty, SLATE (Jul. 24, 2012) http://www.slate.com/blogs/breakingviews/2012/07/24/
do_it_yourself_ law_firm_ipo_looks_a_bit_too_feisty_.html (noting a 43% improvement in 
first quarter earnings in 2012). 
25 Last Will & Testament, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/legal-
wills/wills-overview.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). 
26 Living Trust, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/living-trusts/living-
trusts-overview.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). 
27 See generally Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 727 F.Supp.2d 782 (W.D. Mo. 
2010). See also Washington Attorney General zooms in on LegalZoom’s claims, WASHINGTON 
STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Sept. 16, 2010), www.atg.wa.gov/
pressrelease.aspx?id=26466#.UpqghaXGcig [hereinafter Washington Attorney General]. 
4
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LegalZoom from continuing business.
28
 In 2012, LegalZoom’s services were 
challenged by the North Carolina State Bar and a resident of Ohio.
29
 Finally, 
in 2013, class actions against LegalZoom were filed in both Texas and 
Arkansas.
30
 LegalZoom reported a $5.4 million loss related to the company’s 
legal settlements on their initial public offering.
31
 Most of the cases brought 
against LegalZoom allege that the company is engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law.
32
 
One of the first lawsuits brought against LegalZoom in 2010, Janson 
v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., resulted in the district court’s denial of 
LegalZoom’s motion for summary judgment.32 The Missouri court explained 
that LegalZoom’s services “go beyond self-help” and “affect secular 
rights.”33  The Janson case involved a class action suit brought by Todd 
Janson, Gerald Ardrey, Chad Ferrell, and C&J Remodeling.
34
 The only 
discernible harm to the plaintiffs in the Janson case was the money spent for 
documents prepared unlawfully by an unlicensed entity.
35
 But, as critics of 
the lawsuit note, the plaintiffs in Janson did not allege that the services 
provided by LegalZoom—i.e., the documents prepared—were in any way 
inadequate.
36
 In denying LegalZoom’s motion for summary judgment, the 
court distinguished LegalZoom’s document preparation from legally 
approved “self-help” kits, calling the former a “legal document preparation 
service,” which constitutes practicing law, and the latter a mere “good[]”, the 
sale of which does not constitute practicing law.
37
 The court found that the 
practice of law by LegalZoom creates a “clear risk of the public being served 
in legal matters by incompetent or unreliable persons.”38 Finding “little or no 
                                                 
28 See generally Stephanie Rabiner, LegalZoom Sued by Alabama Bar Group for 
Unauthorized Practice, FINDLAW, (July 20, 2011, 5:44 AM), www.blogs.findlaw.com
/strategist/2011/07/legalzoom-sued-by-alabama-bar-group-forunauthorized-practice.html). 
29 See generally LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 
2012 WL 3678650 (N.C. Super. August 27, 2012). See also generally Lowry v. 
LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 4:11CV02259, 2012 WL 2953109 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2012). 
30 See generally Solotko v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 03-10-00755-CV, 2013 
WL 3724770 (Tex. App. 2013) (denying class certification requirements were met by 
plaintiff). See also generally LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d 261 (2013). 
31 See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 7, n. 1 (May 10, 
2012). 
32 See Washington Attorney General, supra note 27. See also LegalZoom Sued by 
Alabama Bar, supra note 28; N.C. State Bar, 2012 WL 3678650 at *1; Lowry, 2012 WL 
2953109 at *1; McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d at 262. See generally Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 
802 F.Supp.2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011). 
33 Id. at 1064, 1069. 
34 Janson Compl. ¶¶ 1–3, Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://ipwatchdogs.com
/cases/janson_v_legalzoom_complaint.pdf. 
35 Janson Compl. ¶¶ 23–25. 
36 Daniel Fisher, Missouri Lawyers Sue to Block Online Competition, FORBES 
(May 13, 2011), www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/05/13/missouri-lawyers-sue-to-
block-online-competition/. 
37 Janson, 802 F.Supp.2d at 1064. 
38 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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difference” between LegalZoom and a practicing attorney, the court denied 
LegalZoom’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go 
forward.
39
 LegalZoom quickly settled.
40
 
LegalZoom’s legal woes did not end after its settlement in Janson. 
Under LegalZoom’s settlement with the Washington State Attorney 
General’s office, the company submitted an Assurance of Discontinuance. 
The Assurance guaranteed, among other things, the site would no longer 
compare its costs to the costs of a licensed attorney without also providing a 
disclosure that LegalZoom’s services are not a substitute for an attorney’s or 
a law firm’s services.41 In 2007, the North Carolina State Bar issued a Cease 
and Desist letter to LegalZoom.
42
 LegalZoom did not cease and desist, 
however, and in November of 2010, LegalZoom attempted to register its 
services with the North Carolina Bar.
42
 Taking issue specifically with 
LegalZoom’s prepaid legal services, the North Carolina Bar denied 
registration.
43
 When LegalZoom sought a declaratory judgment prescribing 
that LegalZoom is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in North 
Carolina, the court refused to rule on the issue, holding that the facts were 
not ripe enough to issue declaratory relief.
44
 While LegalZoom continues to 
offer its document services in North Carolina, the company is still proscribed 
from offering prepaid legal plans in that state.
45
 With the Arkansas Supreme 
Court compelling arbitration of the class claims against LegalZoom, 
litigation over whether LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law in that state continues.
46
 
                                                 
39 Id. at 1065, 1069. 
40 Debra Cassens Weiss, LegalZoom Can Continue to Offer Documents in 
Missouri Under Proposed Settlement, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 23, 2011), www.abajournal.
com/news/article/legalzoom_can_continue_to_offer_documents_in_missouri_under_proposed
_settle/ (settling a mere 21 days after the Missouri court’s denial for summary judgment). 
41 See generally Washington Attorney General, supra note 26. See also Def.’s 
Assurance of Discontinuance ¶2.1(a), Sept. 15, 2010, available at www.atg.wa.gov
/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2010/LegalZoomAOD.pdf. 
42 N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2012 WL 3678650 at *2 (N.C. Super. Aug. 
27, 2012). 
42 Id. at *3. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at *6. 
45 See generally www.legalzoom.com/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/business.
html (the author attempted to register for a prepaid Business Legal Plan in North Carolina and 
was met with an error message stating “We’re sorry! Business Advantage Pro is not currently 
available in the state you selected”). 
46 McIllwain, 429 S.W.3d at 266 (“while we confess that it is tempting to say that 
our authority to regulate the practice of law, granted to us by the Arkansas Constitution, 
empowers us to reserve the questions regarding the unauthorized practice of law for the courts 
of this state over which we have a superintending authority, we are chastened by the 
awareness of our duty to defer to the Supreme Court of the United States on matters of federal 
statutory interpretation” and therefore the FAA controls and compels arbitration to decide 
whether or not LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law). But see id. 
(“Whether the contract mentioned in the underlying case contains only one, or even a dozen 
arbitration clauses, is irrelevant to the issue presented because the contract is wholly irrelevant 
6
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 38 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss1/2
2015] CRYING OVER SPILT MILK 37 
There remains, however, some hope for LegalZoom. The lawsuit in 
2011 brought by E. Allen Dodd, a lawyer in Alabama, resulted in a 
dismissal.
47
 The Alabama court ruled that LegalZoom could continue its 
services in Alabama, and the Alabama Bar refused to intervene to make the 
case that LegalZoom was practicing law unlawfully.
48
 The Alabama Bar’s 
refusal to act, and the court’s refusal to hold that LegalZoom is engaged in 
the unauthorized practice of law, would seem to suggest that Alabama laws 
do not prohibit LegalZoom’s continued operation in that state. 49 
Additionally, although no ruling on the merits has come from the class action 
brought against LegalZoom in Texas, Texas courts are likely to hold that 
LegalZoom is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
50
 In addition 
to state support of this online legal alternative, many legal academics support 
LegalZoom and similar services, and other regulatory branches support 
relaxed rules to allow services like LegalZoom to exist.
51
 
 C.  The Possibility & the Problems 
The possibilities available for consumers if LegalZoom is accepted 
in all 50 states are clear: affordable, efficient, and user-friendly legal 
services.
52
 However, LegalZoom’s forms and services are not perfect. In fact, 
                                                                                                                   
to the question of whether LegalZoom has engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law...nothing in the FAA preempts the courts from carrying out their duties to regulate the 
practice of law”) (Hannah, C.J., dissenting). 
47 Chas Rampenthal, Alabama Lawsuit Against LegalZoom Dismissed, 
GLOBENEWSWIRE (Feb. 1, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2011/02
/01/438943/212411/en/Alabama-Lawsuit-Against-LegalZoomDismissed.html (citing www.
legalzoom.com). 
48 See generally Pl.’s Pet. Writ of Mandamus, No. 1091717, 2010 WL 4234944 at 
*1. 
49 See generally Rampenthal, supra note 47; see also supra note 48. 
50 In 1999, a Texas district court heard a challenge to Parsons Technology, Inc.’s 
Quicken Family Lawyer Software that claimed the software was engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law. See Schindler, supra note 9, at 186. Although the district court ruled that the 
software was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the Texas legislature subsequently 
passed legislation overturning the court’s decision. Id. The unauthorized practice of law 
statute in Texas now excludes websites, books, and software programs which “clearly and 
conspicuously” state that the resources are not a “substitute for the advice of a lawyer.” Id. 
(citing Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.101 (2011)). LegalZoom will likely fall under this 
exclusion, depending on how the court defines “conspicuously,” if the court is asked to do so. 
When accessing the Business Legal Plan (described in Part III.A supra), a customer that 
chooses Texas is provided language stating “[w]e are not a law firm or a substitute for an 
attorney or law firm” at the bottom of the page in fine print–seemingly bringing LegalZoom 
within the exclusion set-out by the Texas legislature. 
51 See Cristina L. Underwood, Balancing Consumer Interests in a Digital Age: A 
New Approach to Regulating the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437, 445 
(2004) (“The Federal Trade Commission has… criticized state use of broad practice of law 
definitions for… failure to accommodate access to emerging technologies”). 
52 See Isaac Figueras, The LegalZoom Identity Crisis: Legal Form Provider or 
Lawyer in Sheep’s Clothing?, 63 CASE W. RES. 1419, 1429 (2013) (stating “[i]f LegalZoom’s 
business model survives, then this could be a significant step towards the commoditization of 
7
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LegalZoom disclaims a guarantee that any form or service is “correct, 
complete[,] or up-to-date.” 53  Thus, there is tension between possible 
advances in the commoditization of law and the quality of services that 
commodity provides. Below is an exploration of two of the most common 
issues with LegalZoom, and whether or not the academic alarm over these 
issues is warranted. 
1.  Practice of Law 
As mentioned above in Part III.B, most litigation brought against 
LegalZoom revolves around claims that LegalZoom is engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law. Further, LegalZoom itself recognizes the threat 
unauthorized practice laws imposes to the success of its business, positioning 
this concern first in a list of “Risks Relating to Our Business” in its 2012 
SEC IPO filing.
54
 The definition of what is the practice of law varies from 
state to state.
55
 In addition to non-uniformity among states, attempts to define 
“the practice of law” have historically been fruitless.56 Generally, the practice 
of law is marked by an exercise of professional judgment by a trained 
lawyer.
57
 This professional judgment is exercised when an attorney uses her 
ability to analyze a specific legal issue by applying “the general body and 
philosophy of law.”58 The general purpose of unauthorized practice statutes 
is to protect consumers.
59
 Regulating who may practice law protects 
consumers because a license ensures that the practitioner has the education 
                                                                                                                   
law… [t]his provides many advantages to consumers who were previously unable to access 
affordable, customized legal services”). See, e.g., Mathew Rotenberg, Stifled Justice: The 
Unauthorized Practice of Law and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 720 
(2012) (asserting that “[c]onsumers are benefiting [from LegalZoom] as well, using these 
products as affordable alternatives to hiring an attorney”). 
53 Terms of Use, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com/legal/general-terms/terms-
of-use (stating “LegalZoom strives to keep its legal documents accurate, current and up-to-
date. However, because the law changes rapidly, LegalZoom cannot guarantee that all of the 
information on the Site or Applications is completely current. The law is different from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and may be subject to interpretation by different courts. [. . .] [T]he 
legal information contained on the Site and Applications . . . is not guaranteed to be correct, 
complete or up-to-date”). 
54 See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 11 (May 10, 
2012). 
55 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 cmt. 1 (2013). 
56 See Catherine Lanctot, Conference on Legal Ethics: “What Needs Fixing?”: 
Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation and the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 811 (2012) (stating “lawyers have famously struggled for 
decades to define what it is that they do for a living… it is the amorphous nature of the 
practice of law that makes inquiries into unauthorized practice principles so challenging”). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (citing Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 3-5 (1982)). 
59 See Rotenberg, supra note 52 at 714. See also Schindler, supra note 10, at 439. 
8
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and ability to grapple with complex legal issues and provides a means of 
meeting consumer expectations of effective legal service.
60
 
Many believe LegalZoom is engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law.
61
 Instead of simply providing blank forms with instructions, LegalZoom 
makes determinations about which form best suits the needs of the consumer 
based on the consumer’s answers to a questionnaire.62 LegalZoom also drafts 
legal documents which include information deemed necessary by its 
algorithms.
63
 For example, when a business owner is debating which type of 
legal entity to form, LegalZoom provides an online questionnaire which, 
after answering a few basic questions about the future business, allows the 
consumer to “choos[e] the right business structure.” 64  This advice giving 
function, and parallel form-choosing function, brings LegalZoom into 
traditional “practice of law” territory.65 
The concerns deriving from a nonlawyer practicing law are varied. 
First, lay consumers may not be capable of determining which form best 
suits their needs, or if the form selected by LegalZoom best fits their needs.
66
 
This means that lay consumers may be saddled with a product that is 
inadequate for, or actually harms, the consumer’s interest—an issue that is 
normally addressed through regulations ensuring those practicing law are 
adequately trained to provide sufficient solutions to legal issues.
67
 
                                                 
60 See Underwood, supra note 51, at 440. Underwood also discusses that license 
requirements allow for confidentiality when an attorney-client relationship is formed, but this 
fact will be discussed in the next section. 
61 See supra, Part II.B. 
62 See Janson, 802 F.Supp.2d at 1055–57. See also How It Works, LEGALZOOM, 
https://www.legalzoom.com/about-us/how-it-works (last visited Sept. 3, 2014). 
63 See How It Works, supra note 62. 
64 See Starting Your Business, Get Help, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com/
business/guide_intro.html. 
65 See Lanctot, supra note 56, at 849 (“the courts have consistently taken the 
position that selecting which form to use, giving advice about which information ought to be 
included in a form, or soliciting information from a lay person and then making 
determinations about how to use the information in the form is the equivalent of practicing 
law”). See also Figueras, supra note 52, at 1426 (stating “the customization of forms for 
customers and review of their documents for inconsistencies could push LegalZoom into the 
role of a document preparer and therefore into the practice of law”) and at 1438 (asserting 
“[e]ven if the clauses that end up in these forms are written beforehand by attorneys, the fact 
that LegalZoom’s program selects which clauses go in the form supports the argument that 
this constitutes providing legal advice [a form of practicing law]”); Janson, 802 F.Supp.2d at 
1065 (“[a] computer sitting at a desk in California cannot prepare a legal document without a 
human programming it to fill in the document using legal principles that are derived from… 
law that are selected for the customer based on the information provided by the customer… 
there is little or no difference between this and a lawyer… asking a client a series of questions 
and then preparing a legal document based on the answers provided and applicable… law”). 
66 See Lanctot, supra note 56, at 821. 
67 See id. at 848, 854 (“[t]he forms may be outdated or not suitable for use for a 
particular set of facts… [t]here is no follow-up to ensure that the appropriate documents were 
used, or whether additional assistance was necessary”). 
9
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Second, because of LegalZoom’s proclamations about guaranteed 
satisfaction and “personalized, affordable legal protection” consumers may 
be lulled into a false sense of security after purchasing documents or 
services.
68
 Even if consumers have read LegalZoom’s disclaimer and 
understand that the forms and services on the site may not be accurate, 
consumers are still likely to believe that LegalZoom’s documents and 
services are “prepared with a minimal level of competence and care.”69 It is 
hard to reconcile consumer expectations of a “minimal level of competence 
and care” provided by LegalZoom’s own guarantee of quality and 
“affordable legal protection” with LegalZoom’s repudiation of completeness 
or correctness relating to its forms and services.
70
 In light of the tension 
between what LegalZoom guarantees and what it actually provides—along 
with the understanding that consumers generally do not read disclaimers—
the legal community’s concern is that consumers are relying on unreliable 
legal services to their detriment.
71
 If nonlawyers are prohibited from 
providing such services, then consumers are generally justified in relying on 
such services because they are only provided by licensed practitioners. 
Finally, consumers have no recourse in the worst case scenario—the 
LegalZoom document is wholly inadequate for the consumer’s needs and 
therefore provides no legal protection.
72
 Although LegalZoom allows for 
“binding arbitration” should disputes prove unresolvable through informal 
channels, LegalZoom’s disclaimer largely eviscerates the company’s 
liabilities.
73
 With minimal or no consequences resulting from sub-par legal 
instruments and services, LegalZoom has no incentives to ensure accuracy or 
quality. If consumers receive products or services from licensed 
practitioners, however, regulations prevent attorneys from disclaiming such 
liability and therefore attorneys have substantial incentives to ensure 
accuracy and quality.
74
 
                                                 
68 See id. at 854 (“consumers themselves may be misled into thinking that they 
have resolved their legal difficulties without realizing that the documents they have paid for 
are woefully incomplete”). See also Home Page, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com 
(emphasis added). 
69 See Katy Ellen Deady, Cyberadvice: The Ethical Implications of Giving 
Professional Advice Over the Internet, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 902 (2001). 
70 See supra note 63. 
71 See Catherine Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril 
and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 193 (Oct. 1999) (“the nature of disclaimers in cyberspace 
may create difficulties in enforcing them, as they may easily be ignored or avoided with the 
inadvertent click of a mouse”). 
72 See Lanctot, supra note. 56, at 821 (“document preparers [are] largely immune 
from liability for their services”). 
73 See Home Page Disclaimer, LEGAL ZOOM, www.legalzoom.com/disclaimer.
html (“LegalZoom is not responsible for any loss, injury, claim, liability, or damage related to 
your use of this site...whether from errors or omissions in the content of our site… your use of 
the site is at your own risk”). 
74 Model Rules Prof’l Conduct R.1.8(h)(1) (“[a] lawyer shall not make an 
agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice”). 
10
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While the hypothetical harms follow logically from an analysis of 
unauthorized practice laws, the empirical data does not support the 
conclusion that consumers are harmed when unauthorized persons or entities 
practice law.
75
 Of 144 unauthorized practice cases reported between 1908 
and 1969, only 12 claimed “specific injury.” 76  Only 2% of unauthorized 
practice claims are initiated by consumers—the rest are a result of Bar 
Committee initiatives.
77
 Further, it is likely true that many rote and routine 
legal services do not require a Juris Doctor to be completed effectively.
78
 
Allowing para-professionals, such as paralegals, to perform these tasks 
lowers costs while still providing quality services.
79
 Also, although a 
disclaimer of all liability could, in theory, lower quality, consumers will not 
use nonlawyers for legal services if the services provided are routinely 
insufficient.
80
 With empirical data to show that consumers are ultimately not 
the voice of discontent, unlicensed para-professionals having the ability to 
provide quality routine legal services, and market forces ensuring document 
and service quality, it is likely LegalZoom is able to avoid the parade of 
horribles caused by nonlawyers practicing law predicted by academia. 
2.  Attorney-Client Privilege 
Even licensed attorneys are protected from claims when no attorney-
client privilege is formed.
81
 Therefore, a prerequisite to holding LegalZoom 
liable, in addition to or instead of the liability they may face for practicing 
law without a license, is the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Like 
unauthorized practice statutes, whether or not an attorney-client relationship 
has been formed varies by jurisdiction. However, generally courts draw 
                                                 
75 See Rotenberg, supra note 52, at 724 (“[h]arm resulting from the unauthorized 
practice of law is historically overstated”). 
76 Id. at 724–25 (citing Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of 
Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors - Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 159, 203 (1980)). 
77 Id. (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A 
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 43 (1981)). 
78 See Roger C. Cramton, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono: Mandatory Pro 
Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1139 (1991) (“[s]even years of higher education is not 
required for most repetitive transactions” such as “wills, uncontested divorces, simple 
bankruptcies, [and] residential home transactions”). 
79 Id. at 1137. 
80 See Rotenberg, supra note 52, at 726 (“market forces create strong incentives 
for [LegalZoom] to create reliable, cost-efficient,[,] and non-harmful products”) and at 727 
(“existing market forces already incentivize consumer protection, while a variety of legal 
actions provide significant tools for redress”). See also Underwood, supra note 51, at 464 (“a 
demonstrably reliable service does not raise the same concerns” as are normally raised by 
nonlawyers practicing law). 
81 See Deady, supra note 68, at 896 (discussing that a prerequisite to a legal 
malpractice claim is the existence of an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty of 
care). 
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distinctions by gauging the generality of the advice.
82
 Specifically tailored 
advice directed at a present and real legal question ordinarily will give rise to 
an attorney-client relationship.
83
 An attorney-client relationship can arise 
through both explicit and implicit means.
84
 Much like LegalZoom’s 
disclaimer asserting that LegalZoom is not engaged in the practice of law, 
LegalZoom also specifically disclaims the existence of an attorney-client 
relationship.
85
 LegalZoom warns that “you are and will be representing 
yourself in any legal matter you undertake through LegalZoom’s legal 
document service.” 86  However, licensed practitioners have also tried to 
disclaim attorney-client relationships, often to no avail.
87
 There is no reason 
to assume that courts would disallow attorneys to disclaim such a 
relationship but then paradoxically allow LegalZoom to continue the 
practice.
88
 
The duty of care imposed on lawyers as a result of forming an 
attorney-client relationship protects clients in two important ways, among 
others: (1) the relationship ensures loyalty by the attorney to the client, and 
(2) the duty gives rise to the important attorney-client privilege.
89
 As to the 
first concern, there is an argument that LegalZoom does not have loyalty to 
the client, but rather, to profit.
90
 Because the well-being of the client is not 
                                                 
82 See Kristine M. Moriarty, Law Practice and the Internet: The Ethical 
Implications that Arise From Multijurisdictional Online Legal Service, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 431, 
433 (2001) (“[t]he courts have generally drawn the line regarding whether or not a duty exists 
by considering the generality of the advice”). 
83 Id. at 434. See also Deady, supra note 70, at 898 (“[g]iving legal advice has 
been viewed as a hallmark of the attorney-client relationship and the bar has been distinctly 
hostile to lawyers answering questions about specific legal issues”). 
84 See generally Deady, supra note 70, at 897 (“with legal cyberadvice we are 
dealing with an implied attorney-client relationship rather than an explicit contract or 
agreement to provide services”). 
85 Terms of Use, LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com/legal/general-terms/terms-
of-use (“LegalZoom does not and will not create an attorney-client relationship between you 
and LegalZoom”) (Sept. 3, 2014). 
86 Id. 
87 See Moriarty, supra note 81, at 434–35 (“[m]any lawyers attempt to . . . 
disclaim[] the existence of [an attorney-client relationship] . . . [t]hese disclaimers, however, 
are usually unpersuasive to the courts”). 
88 See Schindler, supra note 10, at 207–08 (“in other areas of life, providing a 
disclaimer is not always enough to disclaim liability—New York and Ohio both have statutes 
that void liability disclaimers for parking garages whose employees act negligently in 
handling patrons’ cars . . . [w]hile valuable, cars are likely less valuable than the sum of the 
estate a person leaves in their will, the handling of which deserves care above a level of 
potential negligence”). 
89 See id. at 204 n. 124 (the existence of an attorney-client relationship “insure[s] 
the loyalty of the lawyer to the client unimpaired by intervening and possibly conflicting 
interests.”) (quoting Elliot E. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of 
the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438, 439 (1965)). See also 
Underwood, supra note 51, at 440–41 (“[in] the absence of [the] attorney-client privilege 
courts may compel nonlawyers to testify about communications involving their clients”). 
90 See Schindler, supra note 10, at 189 (“the motivating factor behind publishing 
these tools is profit rather than concern for the public”). 
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the main focus of LegalZoom, there is a possibility that LegalZoom’s legal 
services will be colored by its own interests and resultantly ill-fitted to the 
consumer.
91
 For example, LegalZoom, in order to realize more revenue, may 
try to “up-sell”92 a consumer buying a Last Will by offering a Living Trust. 
Notwithstanding the fact that a Living Trust may not be appropriate for that 
particular consumer, LegalZoom may encourage its purchase. This sort of 
salesmanship is ordinarily not allowed in the law, as the main concern in 
such a transaction is the profit of the legal services provider and not the well-
being of the client.
93
 
As to the second concern, LegalZoom specifically disclaims the 
existence of an attorney-client privilege.
94
 Further, because LegalZoom is not 
an attorney, or an attorney’s subordinate, LegalZoom is not covered by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct and therefore customers of LegalZoom could 
not form an attorney-client relationship. Without the attorney-client 
privilege, LegalZoom may be subpoenaed for information relating to one of 
its two million customers.
95
 Imagine a father who leaves all of his money to 
his new wife and disinherits his children. During a moment of unhappiness 
with his marriage, the father creates an account on LegalZoom in order to 
file for an uncontested divorce. After filling out the questionnaire, 
LegalZoom sends the divorce documents to the father. The father’s marriage 
gets better, he decides not to file for an uncontested divorce, and burns the 
documents. Unfortunately, a few months later, the father falls ill and passes 
away. The father’s children may claim that the will leaving all the money to 
the new wife does not represent the wishes of their now deceased father and, 
in order to prove it, could subpoena LegalZoom to prove their father tried to 
file for divorce.
 96
 If that same father had gone to an attorney to prepare 
divorce documents, the court, and the children, would be unable to subpoena 
the attorney for the same documents because of the attorney-client privilege. 
                                                 
91 See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1125 (“the assistance of lawyers is either 
essential or highly advantageous in dealing with court or administrative proceedings . . . [and] 
although . . . nonlawyers could handle many routine tasks . . . a . . . person is at a severe 
disadvantage if an experienced and able lawyer is representing the opposing interest”). 
92 While selling an item, the salesperson attempts to sell a complimentary, but 
perhaps unnecessary, item in order to boost sales. 
93 Model Rules Prof’l Conduct § 1.7, cmt 1 (“[l]oyalty and independent judgment 
are essential… in the lawyer’s relationship with the client… [c]oncurrent conflicts of interest 
can arise...from the lawyer’s own interests” and are prohibited). See also Lanctot, supra note 
56, at 848 (examining bankruptcy cases and concluding that the negative outcomes in the 
cases studied arose from either “misrepresentation or negligence by unscrupulous 
entrepreneurs trying to make a quick buck” or “honest lay practitioners, who genuinely 
believed they were providing valuable service, [and] made basic errors because of their lack of 
adequate training or experience with the complexities of the bankruptcy codes”). 
94 LEGALZOOM, www.legalzoom.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2014) 
(“[c]ommunications between you and LegalZoom are protected by our Privacy Policy but not 
by the attorney-client privilege”). 
95 See Rotenberg, supra note 52, at 736. 
96 See Underwood, supra note 51 at 441 (“courts may compel nonlawyers to 
testify about communications involving their clients”). 
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Although the hypotheticals offered above are possible negative 
scenarios following from a consumer using LegalZoom, the benefits may 
outweigh the costs.
97
 In the 12 years LegalZoom has been in operation, there 
has been little public outcry concerning the inadequacy of LegalZoom 
products, other than from practicing attorneys.
98
 This lack of public 
displeasure would seem to indicate a general satisfaction with the legal 
services LegalZoom provides to its consumers.
99
 If LegalZoom is able to 
provide a minimal level of legal protection to those consumers who cannot 
otherwise afford an attorney, or who simply would not otherwise choose to 
see an attorney, such services may help prevent some litigation that would 
have otherwise occurred had those consumers not turned to LegalZoom.
100
 
Additionally, it is likely true that some help for otherwise pro se litigants is 
better than no help.
101
 Pro se litigants can be a burden on the court systems 
and, with no information whatsoever at their disposal, often do a poor job of 
representing themselves.
102
 Even if not every document or service created 
and sold by 
LegalZoom is perfect for a particular consumer, for those consumers 
who find success using LegalZoom there is no subsequent litigation or, if 
there is, the consumers are better prepared to represent themselves, relieving 
some of the burden on the court system. 
                                                 
97 See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1128 (“[v]iewed in light of the alternatives–—
no representation or self-representation—the competency problem is overstated”). See also 
Richard W. Painter, Symposium on Ethical Issues and Trends in Family Law Pro Se Litigation 
in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 60 (2011) 
(“[l]egal services are a necessity for many people and should be available for persons of 
modest means, even if some qualitative sacrifices have to be made and some ethics rules have 
to be adjusted”). 
98 See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (May 10, 2012) 
(explaining that in the first ten years of operation, LegalZoom surveyed “two million 
consumers,” and that in 2011 “nine out of ten of our surveyed customers said they would 
recommend LegalZoom to their friends and family” an apparent indication of satisfaction). 
See also David A. Hiersekorn, So, What’s So Bad About LegalZoom.com, Anyway?, 
www.kctrustlaw.com/files/Download/Legalzoom.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2014) (an account 
of the experience of one estate planning lawyer using LegalZoom to create a will and a 
documenting of the failures of the will to address his specific needs). 
99 See LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement, supra note 97, at 1. But see 
Lanctot, supra note 56, at 854 (“we have no way of knowing how courts will react in the 
future, when the first dot-com wills are probated or divorce papers are challenged, and turn 
out to have been inadequate under the law”). 
100 See Rotenberg, supra note 52at 733 (stating LegalZoom may “create a new 
preventative market for consumer driven legal services”). 
101 See Painter, supra note 97, at 53 (“courts recognize that computerized legal 
forms can help pro se litigants and save judges some of the time they spend dealing with 
litigants who are unprepared”). 
102 See id. at 45 (“litigants are generally doing a poor job of representing 
themselves and are burdening the courts”). 
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III. THE HIGH PRICE OF LAW 
The issue with the organized bar taking actions to enjoin 
LegalZoom’s continued existence is that the legal community’s failure to 
provide affordable legal services to all those who need legal services has a 
long and well-documented history. The bar took notice of this disparity as 
early as 1908, and the disparity continues and has grown into this decade. 
These next sections explore the past failings of the bar to ensure access to the 
justice system, the bar’s recent history and continued failure to provide 
access, and potential causes of the vacuum that has been created through 
providing the very wealthy and the very poor legal services, with no services 
going to those in between. 
A.  The Past 
One of the “Core Principles” of the legal profession is that lawyers 
have “an obligation to the public in addition” to an obligation to the client.103 
These obligations to the public have justified special privileges given to the 
legal profession—such as self-regulation—and manifested in the form of 
ideological visions of attorneys committed to the “spirit of public service.”104 
“The professional ideal is that each lawyer should strive to make the legal 
system live up to its grand promise of equality before and under the law.”105 
While this has been the aspiration, the legal profession, in practice, 
has fallen short of the ideal. The first code attempting to regulate the ethics 
of attorneys made its debut in 1908.
106
 The codification of the profession’s 
duty of “honesty, integrity, and impartial[ity]” was a response to the public’s 
perceptions that the legal profession did not serve the public, but rather only 
the “wealthy and powerful.”107 However, the members of the American Bar 
Association, when drafting the 1908 Canon, believed new attorneys who 
charged contingency fees and advertised themselves in order to attract more 
business were the source of the image problem.
108
 And so, the ABA took the 
first step of many to limit access for less wealthy individuals by regulating 
both contingency fees and advertising.
109
 
                                                 
103 Christopher J. Whelan, Some Realism About Professionalism: Core Values, 
Legality, and Corporate Law Practice, in Enron and Other Corporate Fiascos: The 
Corporate Scandal Reader, 813 (Nancy B. Rapoport, et al. ed. 2, 2009). 
104 See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1121–22. 
105 Id. at 1122. 
106 See Douglas L. Colbert, Katrina and the Rule of Law in the Time of Crisis: 
Natural Disasters and the Rule of Law in the Time of Crisis: Professional Responsibility in 
Crisis, 51 HOW. L.J. 677, 690 (2008). 
107 Id. at 690–91. 
108 Id. at 695. 
109 Id. 
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The next attempt to ensure ethical behavior was not until 1969, at the 
height of the civil rights movement.
110
 Members of the legal community 
were aware that colleagues had been part of sophisticated schemes which 
helped segregationists skirt the profound new mandates coming out of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.
111
 The movement to supplement and amend the 1908 
Canons grew from the ABA’s view that members of the bar were tasked with 
a responsibility to “safeguard individual rights.”112 Still, however, the new 
Model Code codified a lawyer’s responsibility to “serve the unrepresented” 
only as an aspirational goal in the Ethical Considerations rather than a rule 
with disciplinary consequences.
113
 
Subsequently, the bar saw many changes. In 1975, the Federal 
government established the Legal Services Corporation (LSC)—an 
organization that provided publicly funded legal assistance to indigent 
clients.
114
 Many law school graduates entering the workforce in the 1960s 
and 1970s were committed to public service and were seeking employment 
with organizations that provided legal aid to the poor.
115
 By 1980, the Legal 
Services Corporation was at its apex, employing 6,000 attorneys.
116
 Parallel 
to this expansion of legal aid services in the U.S. was the expansion and 
establishment of “elite” law firms.117 The 1980s also saw the largest surge in 
the elite law firm arena—the growth rate prior to 1975 holding at 5% and 
jumping to 8% after 1975.
118
 
                                                 
110 Id. at 697 (“Changing the legal profession’s view toward regulating members’ 
ethical conduct rarely occurs in a historical vacuum… virtually every change in… practice… 
reflects… prevailing political and social forces operating in the period of reform”). 
111 Id. at 700. 
112 See Colbert, supra note 106, at 698. 
113 Id. at 702. 
114 See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1118. 
115 Colbert, supra note 106, at 704–05. 
116 See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1118. 
117 See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic 
Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
1, 10–11 (2011). “Elite law firms” (also often referred to as “Big Law”) are most notable for 
their size, structure, and clientele. Id. at 8–10. Although employing more attorneys than 
traditionally would be part of firms in the 1960s, elite law firms were notable for the small 
number of partners at the top with many “lesser” attorneys working under them. Id. at 9. The 
structure was bureaucratic, with the marching orders coming from the senior partners and the 
majority of the substantive work completed by the junior associates. Id. at 23–25. Elite law 
firms dealt primarily, if not exclusively, with “captains of industry,” the large corporations 
and the wealthy entrepreneurs. Id. at 8. 
118 See Burk & McGowan, supra note 117 at 11–12. While only thirty-eight firms 
in the U.S. had more than fifty lawyers in the 1950s, there was an astonishing 508 firms with 
more than fifty lawyers in the 1980s, and there were more than 250 law firms employing 100 
or more attorneys. Id. This expansion in the number of attorneys employed by elite law firms 
tracked the expansion of elite law firms into multiple jurisdictions, rather than the “single 
city” model of the 1960s. Id. at 12. 
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B.  The Present 
In 1983, the Kutak Commission of the ABA redrafted the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct into the version with which the lawyers 
currently in practice are familiar.
119
 Due to an increasing understanding that 
pro bono service is an ethical duty of the legal profession, the Commission 
attempted to codify a mandatory pro bono requirement into the Code.
120
 This 
measure was met with strong support and equally strong resistance.
121
 The 
result was the Commission’s ultimate adoption of Rule 6.1,”[e]very lawyer 
has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to 
pay . . . a lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono… 
services per year.”122 Again, the ideal of lawyers dedicated to public service 
remained an aspiration, without being required.
123
 
Meanwhile, elite law firms became bigger and made more money.
124
 
The 250 largest law firms in the U.S. in 2008 employed, on average, 535 
attorneys.
125
 The average salary for a first year law associate in an elite law 
firm in 2007 was $160,000 and the average salary for equity partners in the 
100 most profitable firms was $1.3 million.
126
 This increase in salary amount 
correlated with a rise in the cost of the billable hour. In 2007, elite law firms 
were charging clients $200-$300 an hour for first year associate work.
127
 
During this same year, while money spent on non-LSC funding grew to $753 
million, only about $375 million was spent on the LSC.
128
 In 2009, “the 
United States continued to rank last among peer nations in government 
support for legal aid.”129 
C.  The Vacuum 
With elite law firms serving the very rich, and legal aid 
organizations serving the very poor, a vacuum is created for middle- and 
low-income individuals who need (or want) access to the justice system but 
do not qualify for assistance and cannot afford attorneys.
130
 For example, in 
                                                 
119 Colbert, supra note 106, at 707. 
120 Id. at 710. 
121 Id. at 711. 
122 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 6.1 (2013) (emphasis added); see also 
Colbert, supra note 106, at 707. 
123 Colbert, supra note 106, at 712. 
124 Burk & McGowan, supra note 117, at 12. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 13–14, 21. 
127 Id. at 22. Some equity partners were making as much as $1,000 per hour during 
this same year. Id. 
128 See Jeanne Charn, Legal Services for All: Is the Profession Ready?, 42 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1030 (2009). 
129 Id. at 1022. 
130 Id. at 1045 (“[w]e have had a nearly exclusive focus on the very poor at the 
expense of middle-income people who also cannot afford traditional market-rate lawyer 
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1994 the ABA reported that 61% of people with moderate incomes that 
needed legal assistance never actually accessed the justice system.
131
 While 
most lawyers do participate in pro bono, participation is often self-serving 
and generally does not help to ameliorate the barriers to access.
132
 
Additionally, although the recession decreased salaries of incoming 
associates and partners in elite law firms, the price of the services in those 
firms still increased, placing those services further from reach for low- and 
middle-income individuals.
133
 So now the questions is this: When members 
of the bar generally agree that the legal community has an ethical duty to 
serve those who are unrepresented, when lawyers in both practice and 
academia are intently aware of low- and middle-income persons lack of 
access to the justice system, and with the recession threatening the previous 
elite law firm model, why has the legal profession failed to fill this vacuum? 
Three theories are pervasive. 
1.  Monopoly 
First, lawyers have a monopoly over legal services.
134
 Each state, and 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, forbid unlicensed persons from 
providing legal services.
135
 In this environment, individuals must either risk 
representing themselves or seek the services of an attorney.
136
 With no 
competition, there can be little coercive pressure to reduce costs.
137
 “The 
autonomy of law is . . . that of an institution that can establish its own values 
. . . without pressure to take into account an important value for participants 
                                                                                                                   
services”); see also Cramton, supra note 78, at 1116, 1119 (“[t]hose who want lawyers and 
are able to pay for them have little difficulty finding reasonably competent professional 
services”) and (“[t]he working poor, and large portions of the middle class, encounter 
problems in selecting and paying for lawyers”). 
131 See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers 
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 960 (2000). 
132 See Cramton, supra note 78, at 1124. (“much of [the time spent on pro bono] is 
directed toward activities that build relations with other lawyers, such as bar association work, 
or work that is designed to attract clients, such as free or reduced-rate work for local charities” 
explaining this is so because Model Rule 6.1 gives many options to fulfill pro bono duties, not 
limited to helping those that cannot afford representation). See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 
960 (Another study done by the ABA in 1990 found that 52% of divorces were obtained 
without attorneys and 88% of family cases litigated had at least one party with no 
representation or one party who failed to appear.) 
133 See Burk & McGowan, supra note 117, at 33 (“[m]any large firms… reduced 
entering associates’ salaries by 10–20% with similar reductions up the line in the more senior 
classes”). See also id. at 36 (“many large firms announced increases in their… standard… 
rates in early 2009 and again in early 2010” although the increases were “more modest” than 
in previous years). 
134 See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 78, at 1126; Hadfield, supra note 125, at 954; 
Schindler, supra note 10, at 187. See also supra Part III.C.1. 
135 See supra Part III.C.1. See also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 (2013). 
136 See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 993. 
137 Id. 
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in the system: the cost of participating.”138 In addition to a monopoly over 
the actual service, lawyers also generally hold a monopoly over the 
information needed to effectively resolve a legal issue.
139
 This monopoly 
over information results in consumers having little coercive pressure to 
reduce costs because consumers do not have the tools to readily valuate legal 
services.
140
 Some members of the profession believe the monopoly is 
precisely the reason that lawyers have an affirmative duty to provide legal 
services for free, or at reduced rates.
141
 
2.  Greed 
A second theory for why legal services are unaffordable is because 
lawyers are greedy.
142
 What the public perceives as greedy is often translated 
in legal academia as the tension between the law as a profession and the law 
as a business.
143
 As a professional, a lawyer serves the public as well as the 
client.
144
 As a businessperson, a lawyer serves the bottom line.
145
 When 
money is the motivating factor behind representation, lawyers become 
                                                 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 985–92 (discussing “natural barriers of entry” into the legal market—
legal education, practical experience, and a cognitive ability to engage in complex reasoning). 
140 Victor E. Schwartz, et al., Consumer Protection in the Legal Marketplace: A 
Legal Consumer’s Bill of Rights Is Needed, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 2 (2002) (“[t]he 
result is that consumers may not have all the information they need to make an educated 
decision when choosing either an attorney or a payment plan for legal fees . . . most 
consumers do not know the value of a claim, how much work and skill will be needed for the 
attorney to pursue it, or its chance of success . . . [c]onsequently a consumer may be 
overcharged for legal services”). 
141 See Cramton, supra note78, at 1126 (“[L]awyers have a special responsibility 
to provide legal assistance to the poor because of the profession’s… its monopoly of legal 
services.”). 
142 See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 954 (when discussing reasons why the price of 
law is so high, Hadfield asserts that popular culture believes it is because “lawyers are an 
avaricious lot who will bleed you dry”); See also Jessica J. Sage, Authority of the Law? The 
Contribution of Secularized Legal Education to the Moral Crisis of the Profession, 31 FLA. 
ST. U.L. REV. 707, 707–08 (2004) (“[O]ver the last century the study of law has undergone a 
significant transformation and earned itself a reputation amongst the public as one of being 
unethical and greedy.”). 
143 See David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces 
to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
203, 205 (2004) (“[I]n a system in which law practice is a business, if it does not cost the 
business itself any money it doesn’t matter… making a motion that a judge calls ‘stupid’ isn’t 
a problem, because if the client can pay the freight, you have created more billable hours to 
pad the bottom line… as a business person, if it does not cost you it is simply not real.”) 
(emphasis added). 
144 See Whelan, supra note 103, at 813 (“lawyers have been called upon to be 
professional—entailing some public service ideal—despite also making a living”). 
145 See Barnhizer, supra note 143, at 232 (“We have increasingly seen the 
assertion that law practice should be viewed as a business activity run for profit rather than a 
principled profession in which lawyers are obligated to behave in a higher and more ethical 
manner.”). 
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beholden to their clients or may engage in bill padding, resulting in the 
appearance of, or actual, greed.
146
 
3.  Market 
Market forces are more likely than monopoly or greed, however, to 
be driving prices up.
147
 The legal market “is characterized by a bidding 
competition between commercial actors and individuals for access to scarce 
legal resources.” 148  In addition, the practice of law is difficult and 
complex.
149
 The complexity and difficulty of law results in high costs 
because it takes a lot of effort and time for a lawyer to resolve even the most 
benign legal matter effectively and with enough due diligence to satisfy the 
requirements of Model Rule 1.3.
150
 When wealthy corporate and individual 
clients are competing for the same resources as low- or middle-income 
individuals, more resources will inevitably be allocated to the wealthy client 
as it is the wealthy client that will be able to adequately compensate the 
attorney for the amount of work devoted to the legal issue.
151
 This allocation 
of resources distorts the price of legal services, allowing the corporate and 
wealthy clients to determine the pricing mechanism for all legal services.
152
 
IV. THE SOLUTION 
Lawyers have had opportunities to fix the disparities in the provision 
of legal services and have failed to take meaningful action.
153
 One of the first 
chances was in 1908, when the bar was aware of the public perception that 
lawyers were beholden to the wealthiest in society.
154
 Instead of making it 
easier for attorneys to represent clients for free, on a contingency basis, and 
therefore increasing access, the bar stifled attorneys’ ability to contract with 
clients for this fee arrangement.
155
 Then in 1969, when ideals of public 
service and access to justice for all were pervasive within the profession, the 
ABA took the conservative approach.
156
 Instead of capitalizing on the public 
service spirit of the 1960s and 1970s by including a duty of mandatory pro 
bono hours, the ideal of legal services for the unrepresented remained an 
                                                 
146 See Whelan, supra note 103, at 853; see also Barnhizer, supra note 143, at 231. 
147 See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 998. 
148 Id. at 956. 
149 Id. at 965–67. Complex not only because of the intricacies involved but also 
because of the schooling required to practice. 
150 Id. at 969. See also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (diligence). 
151 Hadfield, supra note 131, at 973. 
152 Id. at 998 (“[i]t is the wealth of the business client group that ultimately 
determines the pricing in the markets for lawyers… the legal system prices itself out of reach 
of all individuals except those with a claim on corporate wealth”). 
153 See supra notes 108–129 and accompanying text. 
154 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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aspiration.
157
 By the time the Kutak Commission undertook to revise the 
Model Code, it was too late for mandatory pro bono hours.
158
 The idea of 
mandatory pro bono service divided the legal community and the ABA 
faltered at such strong opposition.
159
 Furthermore, despite what the ABA 
could have done to force lawyers to fulfill the public service ideal, attorneys 
did not take it upon themselves to fulfill the promise of providing legal 
services to all who needed it.
160
 
Whether the price of law remains high because a monopoly insulates 
attorneys from outside pressure to lower costs, the sheer greed of bar 
members, or because noncompetitive market forces skew the cost of legal 
services high when corporations and low- and middle-income individuals 
compete for the same resources, the vacuum remains.
161
 LegalZoom provides 
needed access to the legal system that attorneys have been otherwise unable 
(or unwilling) to fulfill.
162
 The services provided by LegalZoom are often 
characterized as “routine” or “common” legal services.163 While LegalZoom 
does not guarantee accuracy or completeness, and warns consumers that the 
company does not provide legal representation, consumers are willing to 
forgo the protections provided by traditional legal services in exchange for 
minimal legal protections.
164
 Even if consumers are fully aware that 
LegalZoom does not guarantee protection of legal rights, consumers know 
that something is better than nothing.
165
  Furthermore, for those consumers 
whose legal issues are completely resolved by purchasing a document or 
service from LegalZoom, the company relieves some of the strain already 
placed on resources of licensed attorneys.
166
 In addition to relieving the strain 
on legal resources, adequate services provided by LegalZoom act as 
preventative measures.
167
 Consumers that might have otherwise needed to 
journey through probate or family court may have resolved their legal issues 
through LegalZoom and never need the court system.
168
 Thus, to the extent 
that LegalZoom’s services adequately meet consumer need, the justice 
system is not burdened by pro se litigants.
169 
Consumers, academics, and some regulators have already recognized 
these benefits.
170
 Most of the criticism pointed at LegalZoom stems from 
                                                 
157 See supra note 122, and accompanying text. 
158 See supra notes 124–126 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
161 See supra notes 134–151 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
163 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra notes 52–53, 53, 85, 99–102 and accompanying text. 
165 See supra note 99–102 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
167 See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra notes 21–25, 47–51 and accompanying text. 
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licensed attorneys—not the public. 171  Alarm about LegalZoom by legal 
professionals has garnered little sympathy from the public that has been 
otherwise forgotten by these same professionals.
172
 This support for 
LegalZoom by consumers, paired with the academic harms (as opposed to 
empirical harms) LegalZoom may cause, is strong evidence that LegalZoom 
will survive the critics.
173
 Moreover, LegalZoom should survive. For too 
long the legal community has underserved the population that LegalZoom 
aims to serve.
174
 Therefore, it is the legal community’s ethical obligation to 
ensure access to the justice system that the bar has been unable to provide is 
provided through services like LegalZoom. While LegalZoom will and 
should survive attacks by the organized bar, the nature of the service does 
pose legitimate threats to consumer interests.
175
 However, these threats do 
not need to mean the end of LegalZoom. Rather, states should act to regulate 
LegalZoom through licensure requirements, disclosures which are thorough 
and conspicuous, and clearly defined unauthorized practice statutes. 
A.  Licensure 
Though there have not been consumer complaints regarding the 
quality of LegalZoom’s documents or services, states should adopt measures 
which hold LegalZoom to a higher duty than their current standard of caveat 
emptor.
176
 Although market forces should ensure that LegalZoom provides 
quality services, lest consumers stop using the site, by creating licenses for 
nonlawyers and nonlawyer entities states could provide incentives with more 
bite than mere customer disapproval.
177
 Theoretically attorneys could be 
                                                 
171 See supra notes 27–30, 77 and accompanying text. 
172 See supra notes 98–99. 
173 See supra notes 21, 36, 47–51, 76–78, and accompanying text; see also 
Lanctot, supra note 56, at 853 (“[W]e must consider the ramifications of [enforcing 
unauthorized practice of law statutes against LegalZoom]. The public reaction would likely be 
negative. Enforcing unauthorized practice of law statutes against online document preparation 
services would be neither painless nor popular. The lay public, which already detests lawyers, 
generally perceives unauthorized practice of law enforcement as yet another way for the legal 
profession to line its collective pockets at the expense of consumers. In addition, it is at least 
possible that these websites are managing to provide some consumers with a necessary 
service—basic legal documents at an affordable price. At a time when the bar seems to have 
abdicated its responsibility to provide routine, noncomplex legal services to the poor and 
middle class, it could well be counterproductive to try to shut down one vehicle for serving 
those unmet needs.”). 
174 See supra notes 3, 109–129 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 53, 66–74, 91, 94–96 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra notes 53, 86 and accompanying text. 
177 See Hadfield, supra note 131, at 1004 (“the boundaries of the profession… 
are… a matter of institutional and deliberate choice… in theory… it is quite possible to 
conceive of a different set of boundaries… over time, [there could be] the development of 
professional identities, degrees, training, and practices [in the legal system] that become as 
distinct from each other as… those of the M.B.A. and the M.S.W.”). See also Painter, supra 
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regulated by the marketplace as well—after all, attorneys are also in the 
business of providing quality services to consumers. However, through 
licensing, state bar associations and state supreme courts are able to ensure 
attorneys comply with a higher level of care and diligence than salespeople 
of other services.
178
 Although consumers turning to LegalZoom are 
necessarily choosing low-cost over high-quality, it does not follow that states 
should wholly protect consumers in one arena–when consumers use licensed 
attorneys–and wholly ignore consumer protection in the other arena–when 
consumers use LegalZoom.
179
 Nor does it make sense to deprive consumers 
of quality affordable alternatives to licensed attorneys. Through licensing, 
and therefore regulating, the services provided by LegalZoom, states can 
provide greater access to the justice system while still ensuring “correct, 
complete, [and] up-to-date” forms and services that aim to actually and 
accurately fulfill consumer needs.
180
 
B.  Disclosure 
Texas courts have already recognized the need for “clear and 
conspicuous” disclosures.181  The most palatable threat LegalZoom has to 
consumer interests is misleading the public into believing that LegalZoom is 
an equivalent replacement for the services of an attorney.
182
 When consumers 
buy “personalized, affordable legal protection” with a “100% satisfaction 
guarantee,” they may not understand that LegalZoom cannot guarantee the 
documents will be enforceable if tested in litigation.
183
 The warnings in the 
fine print at the bottom of the home page that LegalZoom does not represent 
the customer’s interests, hidden in the text of the overwhelmingly long 
Terms of Use, and relegated to the inconspicuous Disclaimer, does not 
provide the consumer an accurate understanding of what they are trading by 
choosing LegalZoom instead of an attorney.
184
 Well-informed consumers 
should be allowed to accept responsibility for a failed legal document and 
waive their right to place that responsibility on the legal services provider in 
exchange for paying lower costs–but the key language is well informed.185 
                                                                                                                   
note 97, at 60 (“[o]rganizations that provide low-cost legal services… should be subject to 
state licensure and regulation of their services”). 
178 See supra notes 60, 74, 138 and accompanying text. 
179 See Charn, supra note 128, at 1048 (guaranteeing access to the justice system 
through nonlawyers “will require an examination of cost and quality trade-offs among 
different modes of service delivery”). 
180 See supra notes 66–74 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra note 50. 
182 See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra notes 53, 86 and accompanying text. 
185 See Underwood, supra note 51, at 467 (“[c]ourts should require that 
nonlawyers disclose this risk to clients at the outset of the relationship… [n]onlawyers could 
satisfy this requirement by way of a written disclaimer, provided the disclaimer is 
unambiguous and is shown to all clients prior to use of the product or service… [i]f consumers 
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Licensing of nonlawyer legal services, as mentioned above, would be able to 
regulate entities like LegalZoom in order to approve and monitor adequate 
disclosure. 
C.  Clear Definitions 
As time has proven, the legal community cannot provide the 
necessary services to all those who need it.
186
 As holders of the keys to 
access, it is incumbent upon the ABA and states to allow for services like 
LegalZoom to flourish and do what licensed attorneys have been unable to 
do.
187
 In order for LegalZoom to succeed, however, states must adopt 
definitions of “practice of law” that are clear and concise. Without an 
adequate definition of what it is the legal community wants to prevent 
nonlawyers from doing, LegalZoom will continuously be under threat of 
class actions by bar associations looking to villainize LegalZoom’s 
apparently harmless unauthorized practice of law.
188
 The legal community 
has failed to provide services for low- and middle-income individuals, and 
created a vacuum by providing services for the very wealthy and the very 
poor. It would be unethical for the legal community to continue to deprive 
these individuals of services by allowing LegalZoom to fail because of the 
uncertainty in current definitions of “the practice of law.” 
V.  CONCLUSION 
LegalZoom does what the bar, thus far, has been unable to do. The 
online form provider brings legal aid to those who cannot otherwise afford it. 
It provides a means for low-income entrepreneurs to start a business, for 
those with a smaller nest-egg to ensure it is taken care of if the worst 
happens, and for moderate-income families to navigate the legalities of love 
and love lost. While LegalZoom is not without its critics, a whopping 2 
million business and personal users, $12 million net income in 2012, plus 
little to no outcry from its users proves that LegalZoom is a valid alternative 
to high-priced lawyers. And while the high price of law cannot be blamed 
exclusively on attorneys themselves, nor on the monopoly attorneys hold in 
the legal services market, nor the greed so often associated in the media with 
the profession of law, nor other market factors such as the enormous cost of 
law school, there remains a vacuum in the legal services market: a vacuum 
that leaves those with low- to middle-incomes without legal services. 
LegalZoom fills that vacuum. Attempts to fill the vacuum, while noble, have 
failed to completely address the legal services gap. And while consumer 
                                                                                                                   
solicit a nonlawyer’s services after reading the disclaimer, then they are presumed to have 
impliedly consented to the lack of privilege”). 
186 See supra notes 106–133 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra notes 134–141 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 32, 38–46, 54–57 and accompanying text. 
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protection is a laudable goal, the milk is spilt and we must now find a way to 
clean it up—LegalZoom is the answer. 
It is no longer appropriate for attorneys to bring suits against 
LegalZoom for phantom harms caused by LegalZoom’s unauthorized 
practice of law. Consumers are demanding access to legal services, and 
LegalZoom is making such access available. The legal community has 
spoken repeatedly throughout history about a duty that each attorney has to 
provide services to those that cannot otherwise afford them. Although this 
ideal has not been met by the legal community, LegalZoom provides an 
alternative that is working. To block access to legal services because of 
something as amorphous as “practice of law” statutes is to effectively deny 
access to legal services to those whom the legal community has neglected: a 
miscarriage of justice and a failure of the profession’s ethical obligations. 
Therefore, the organized bar is ethically obligated to ensure LegalZoom’s 
continuation through changes to current regulations. 
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